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Abstract
In most of the current debate on regionalism versus multilateralism, the countries excluded
from a Preferential Trading Agreement (PTA) are assumed to be passive players with
exogenously fixed trade policies. In reality however, non−members do react to the creation of
a trading bloc and relaxing this assumption can provide useful insights. Using a political
economy model, this paper explore the case where those excluded countries can adjust their
commercial policies in order to minimize the negative effects of the PTA. It is shown that the
creation of a PTA can lead the excluded countries to increase their trade barriers with respect
to the PTA members.
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1.  Introduction 
 
In most of the current debate on regionalism versus multilateralism, the excluded economies are 
assumed to be passive players with exogenously fixed trade policies.  In reality however, non-
members do react to the creation of a trading bloc.  There are broadly four options open to the 
excluded countries in response to a PTA.  Their first option is to apply for membership to or at 
least association with the trading bloc.  Small countries neighboring a large bloc have usually 
found this compelling (e.g., EFTA countries or some of the CEECs).  It has been shown though 
that the incentive of members to accept new members can decrease and go to zero when the 
group size becomes large enough (e.g., Andriamananjara, 1998).  The experience of Norway’s 
application to the EC in 1973 and that of Switzerland’s application to join the EEA in 1992 show 
that this option might also be blocked domestically (by referendum in both cases). 
 
A second option is to participate more vigorously in multilateral negotiations. Multilateral 
disciplines could for instance be used to extract compensation payments from the PTA members.  
The excluded countries could also initiate new rounds of WTO negotiations.  At the least, they 
should make sure that the PTA is subjected to effective multilateral disciplines.  However, it is 
widely accepted that imposing GATT’s Article XXIV
1 on a PTA does not guarantee that the 
excluded countries will not be hurt.  
 
A third option for the excluded countries is to form their own club as a counterbalance.  It has 
often been argued that this was one of the factors behind the US interest in CUFTA and NAFTA, 
and more recently FTAA.  Regionalism elsewhere (e.g., the threat of “fortress Europe”) has also 
clearly motivated some Asian countries to discuss or enter RIAs.  The desire to form a 
counterweight may be enough create a brand new regional agreement.   
 
A fourth option for the excluded countries is to adjust their commercial policies in order to 
minimize the negative effects of the PTA.  This paper explores this option using a simple political 
economy model.  It is shown that the creation of a PTA can lead the excluded countries to 
increase their trade barriers with respect to the PTA members. 
 
                                                 
1  Article XXIV permits deviation from the GATT’s cornerstone “most-favored-nation” c lause under 
certain conditions.  Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions are permitted if (i) the parties go all the way to   3 
2.  The Model 
 
We use a version of the Meade Model with endogenous trade policy, which was introduced by 
Panagariya and Findlay (1996) to study the effects of a PTA on the members’ trade policy.  In 
this paper, the model is used to study the effects on the non-members’ trade policy.  Consider a 
three-country (A, B and C) world with three goods (1, 2, and 3) where A and B are the potential 
PTA partners.  The patterns of trade are exogenously assumed: (i) country B and country C both 
export good 1 to country A; (ii) A exports good 2 to C; (iii) A exports good 3 to B; and (iv) there 
is no trade between B and C.  While other patterns are possible, this one has the merit of 
simplicity and serves our purposes well in a very tractable way.   
 
The objective is to determine C’s response to the establishment of a PTA between A and B.  
Thus, we focus our analysis on C, which exports good 1 and imports good 2.  Assume that good i 
(i = 1 or 2) is produced via a constant returns to scale technology using a specific factor (denoted 
Capital or Ki) and a mobile factor (denoted Labor or Li).  Output in sector i is:  
 
Xi = Fi(Ki, Li).   
 
Price of good 1, received by country C’s producers, is written as p1.  Firms in sector 1 choose L1 
to maximize their profit  p F K L wL 1 1 1 1 1 ( , ) - . This yields the envelope function—denoting the 
return to in sector 1’s specific factor—p
1
1 ( , ) p w  with the following properties: 
 
     p1
1
1 1 1 1 ( , ) ( , ) p w F K L =  and 
     pw p w L
1
1 1 ( , ) = -  
where  p1
1(.)  and  pw
1(.) denote partial derivatives with respect to the first argument and  w 
respectively. 
 
With the appropriate choice of units, the international price of good 2 (the import good) is set to 
unity.  Denote t2 the tariff on good 2 so that its domestic price is (1+ t2).  Firms in sector 2 act 
competitively in the goods and factor markets, and choose  L2 to maximize their profit 
                                                                                                                                                 
free trade on “substantially all” goods that they trade, and if (ii) external tariffs are not “on the whole” more 
restrictive than the “general incidence of duties and regulations” before the grouping was formed.   4 
( ) ( , ) 1 2 2 2 2 2 + - t F K L wL .  This yields the envelope function  p
2
2 1 (( ), ) + t w  with the 
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 pw t w L
2
2 2 1 (( ), ) + = -  
where  p1
2(.)  and  pw
2(.) denote partial derivatives with respect to the first argument and  w 
respectively. 
 
In this model, tariff (t2) is endogenously determined by the labor used in lobbying (l2).  It is 
assumed that there is no lobbying in the export sector.  As in Findlay and Wellisz (1982) and 
Panagariya and Findlay (1996), the lobbying function is written as:  
 
(1)    t2 = g(l2),   where g(0) = 0, g’> 0,  g’’< 0.   
 
The level of lobbying (l2) is chosen by the owner of sector 2’s specific factors to maximize 
p
2
2 2 1 (( ( )), ) + - g l w wl  where the wage rate (w) is taken as given.  This yields the first order 
condition  p1
2
2 (.) '( ) g l w = .  The left-hand side of this expression represents the marginal 
revenue of lobbying (recall that  p1
2
2 2 2 2 1 (( ), ) ( , ) + = t w F K L ) while the right hand side 
represents the marginal cost.  The second order condition associated with the lobbyists’ problem 
requires that the marginal revenue of product of lobby be negative: 
 





2 0 (.) ''( ) (.)[ '( )] .   
 
Finally, there is the full employment constraint:  
 
(2)    L1 + L2 +l2 = L,  
where L is the total labor endowment.   
 
This completes the model.  Panagariya and Findlay (1996) introduce a useful way to rewrite the 
model using the profit function, which is essentially the total return to specific factors before 
subtracting the expenditure on lobbying: 
   5 




2 1 1 + = + + p p . 
 
R(.) has the following properties: 
 
(3)    R1(.) = F1 (= X1); 
(4)    R2(.) = F2 (= X2); and  
(5)    Rw(.) = -(L1 + L2), 
where Ri and Rw denote the first partial with respect to the i-th (i = 1 or 2) argument and  w 
respectively.  Moreover, R(.) is linear homogeneous and strictly convex in its argument: Rii > 0, 
Rww > 0.  Furthermore, separability implies that Rij = 0 for i „ j. Finally, the cross-partials are 
negative: Rwi < 0. 
 
The first order condition of the lobbying decision can be rewritten as: 
 
(6)    R2(.) g’(l2) = w.  
 
 The model now is a fully specified.  Equations (1)-(6) can now be solved for six endogenous 
variables (L1+L2), l2, t2, X1, X2, w. (L1+L2) can be thought of as the total labor used in productive 
activities while l2 is the labor used in unproductive rent seeking activities.  L1 and L2 can be 
recovered once the system is solved.  For completeness, the second order condition of the 
lobbying decision is now written as: 
 
 (7)    S R g l R g l ” + < 2 2 22 2
2 0 (.) ''( ) (.)[ '( )] . 
 
3.  Effects of a PTA 
 
Winters (1997) has argued that the most direct way in which a PTA affects the rest of the world is 
through the terms of trade.  Since country A imports good 1 from both B and C, the local price of 
that good in A’s market, say p1









C),    6 
where p1
B and p1
C are the producer prices in B and C respectively, and t
B and t
C  are the tariffs that 
A imposes on imports from B and C respectively.  A’s preferential liberalization with B—i.e., a 
decrease in t
B—is likely to decrease p1
A even in the presence of a positive price effect on p1
B.  
From C’s viewpoint, as A’s policy with regards to t
C remains the same, the PTA is perceived as a 
deterioration of the terms of trade which is represented by a decline in C’s producer price p1
C
 (i.e., 
d p1 < 0).  (From this point on, C’s producer price will be written simply as p1 instead of p1
C.)    
 
The effects of a PTA on the excluded country have been studied, among others, by Mundell 
(1964) who shows that preferential liberalization by one member unambiguously improves the 
other member’s terms of trade and deteriorates that of the excluded country.   This result has also 
been explicitly shown by Riezman (1979) who  uses a 3-good-3-country model to demonstrate 
this result under reasonable (mainly “regularity”) conditions.  In a model where the PTA 
members’ tariffs are “optimally” determined, Bond, Riezman and Syropoulos (2004) find that the 
liberalization of internal trade by symmetric members can cause the outside country’s terms of 
trade to improve (and its welfare to rise) by inducing PTA members to reduce their  optimal 
external tariffs.  In this paper, we abstract away from “optimal tariff” considerations and keep the 
member’s external tariff constant.  Thus, the outsider’s terms of trade is more likely to worsen.
2    
 
The negative impact of a PTA no the non-members’ terms of trade has, also, been empirically 
shown by Chang and Winters (2002) in the context of Mercosur.  In particular, they find that the 
establishment of Mercosur was associated with significant declines in the prices of non-members’ 
exports to Brazil and that these can be largely explained by tariff preferences. 
 
We can now study the effects of a PTA between A and B on country C’s tariff t2.   Totally 
differentiating equations (1)-(6), we obtain: 
 
(1’)    dt2 = g’(.) dl2; 
                                                 
2  Keeping the PTA members’ external tariffs unchanged is a simplifying assumption that allows us to 
focus on a mechanism that could drive the excluded country’s response to intra-PTA trade liberalization.  
Numerous analysts argued that the establishment of the PTA could lead to an endogenous change in the 
tariffs that members imposes on non members.  In a model similar to the one used here, Panagariya and 
Findlay (1996) show how preferential trading (a FTA more so than a CU) can lead to increased lobbying 
for protection against non-members.  In a political economy model, Ornelas (forthcoming) finds that a 
bilateral agreement may lead members to reduce their tariffs against non-members.  As mentioned, Bond, 
Riezman and Syropoulos (2004) find  that in response to intra-PTA trade liberalization, individual members 
have an incentive to reduce their “optimal” external tariffs.   
   7 
(2’)    d(L1+L2) + dl2 = 0; 
(3’)    R11 dp1 + R1w dw = dX1; 
(4’)    R22 dt2 + R2w dw = dX2; 
(5’)    R1w dp1 + R2w dt2 + Rww dw = - d(L1+L2); 
(6’)    R22 g’(.)dt2 + R2w g’(.)dw + R2 g’’(.)dl2 = dw. 
 
This 6x6 system can be simplified to get a more compact 2x2 system: 
 
    T dl2 + Rww dw = - R1w dp1 
    S dl2 + T    dw  = 0; 
where  S R g l R g l ” + < 2 2 22 2
2 0 (.) ''( ) (.)[ '( )]  and T ” R2w g’(.) –1 < 0 since R2w is negative.  
This system in turn yields the relationship between the terms of trade p1 and respectively the 
wage rate w and the lobbying level l2: 
 
















































0 < , that is, the establishment of the PTA between A and B decreases the wage rate and 
increases the level of lobbying in C.  Solving back into the 6x6 system, the following additional 


























0 > . 
 
Intuitively, there are two different choices for employment:  (i) productive versus unproductive 
lobbying activities and ( ii) producing in the export sector versus producing in the import 
competing sector. The creation of the PTA leads some of the workers initially working in sector 1 
to move into lobbying, and others into import competing sector.     8 
 
In terms of the first choice, a discriminatory arrangement between A and B deteriorates C’s terms 





0 > ).  This in turn 
leads to an increase in the incentive to lobby as the marginal revenue from lobbying becomes 
larger than the marginal cost (which is the wage rate).  Hence, the result is an increase in the level 











0 < ).  This is shown graphically in the upper panel in Figure 1 which represents the 
lobbying decision derived in Equation (6).  The horizontal axis represents the allocation of labor 
between productive and unproductive activities, and a rightward shift (from  l2 to  l2’) in the 
equilibrium denotes an increase in the labor used in lobbying activities. 
 
The dynamics of labor reallocation in the productive sector is shown in the lower panel of Figure 
1 using the usual 3x2 graphical tool representing the marginal revenue product of the two sectors.  
The equilibrium labor allocation is naturally the intersection of the two curves.  Starting from the 
status quo (point 1), the initial decrease in the terms of trade, p1, leads to a decrease in the wage 
rate as well as a movement of labor from the export sector to the import competing one.  This is 
represented by a movement from point 1 to point 2 and it happens because at the status quo labor 
allocation, the marginal revenue of producing in the export sector becomes smaller than that of 
producing in the import competing sector.   
 
The decrease in the total labor available for productive activities (L1+L2) due to the increase in 
l2—represented by a rightward movement of the left horizontal axis and of the import sector’s 
marginal revenue product curve—leads to an increase in the wage rate.  But this increase is not 
enough to offset the initial decline.  Moreover, the decrease in (L1+L2) leads to contractions in 
both productive sectors, which are not enough to offset the initial changes.  Finally, as  t2 
increases, sector 2’s marginal revenue product curve shifts upwards.  These effects are 






















0 > ).  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
In the model presented in this paper, the creation of a PTA causes the excluded countries to raise 
their tariffs against those that are members of the PTA.  Hence, by creating or by joining trading 
bloc, countries can end up losing their market access in the rest of the world.  This possibility of 
“endogenous retaliation” by the excluded countries should be an important consideration for 
countries contemplating the creation of a trading bloc.  This is especially true if the potential 
outsiders include one’s major trading partners.
3    
 
It should be noted that the word “tariff”, as it was used in this paper, should be interpreted very 
broadly as reflecting the general level of protection in the receiving country.  For instance, 
Winters (1996) writes that “in a world of trend liberalization, merely going slowly than you 
otherwise would is essentially a form of increased protection.”   
 
The retaliatory response of the excluded countries could also take the form of the formation of 
another trading bloc.  There is no (and there would not be) WTO rules preventing the excluded 
countries from forming their own bloc.  The creation of the second bloc, in turn, may lead to an 
increase in the external tariffs of the original bloc.   The results in this paper then suggest that the 
current wave of regionalism cold lead to more regionalism, and that the world trading system may 
end up being segmented into a number of competing and relatively closed trading blocs.  
                                                 
3  Panagariya (1994) offers another illustration of this possibility in the context of the feasibility of an East 
Asian trading bloc.  He argues East-Asian countries such as Japan, Korea or China have been persistent 
targets of market-opening actions (structural impediment initiatives or Super 301 threats) by the United 
States during the last two decades.  Initiatives by these countries for a FTA, which can potentially divert 
trade from the US, are almost certain to lead to retaliation from the latter.  Such retaliation would be 
extremely costly, especially for Korea and China which both sell about a quarter of their imports to the US. 
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Figure 1. Labor allocation between productive and lobbying activities and between export and 
import competing sectors: 
 
Upper Panel: As the wage rate decreases from w to w’, the labor employed in the lobbying activities 
increases from l2 to l2’ 
 
Lower Panel: As the terms of trade decreases from p1 to p1’, the wage rate decreases from w to w’, the labor 
employed in the lobbying activities increases from l2 to l2’, the labor employed in the export sector 
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